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Abstract
We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may
include ties in their preference lists. We show that, in such a setting, strong lower bounds
hold for the approximability of each of the problems of finding an egalitarian, minimum
regret and sex-equal stable matching. We also consider stable marriage instances in
which persons may express unacceptable partners in addition to ties. In this setting, we
prove that there are constants δ, δ′ such that each of the problems of approximating a
maximum and minimum cardinality stable matching within factors of δ, δ′ (respectively)
is NP-hard, under strong restrictions. We also give an approximation algorithm for
both problems that has a performance guarantee expressible in terms of the number
of lists with ties. This significantly improves on the best-known previous performance
guarantee, for the case that the ties are sparse. Our results have applications to large-
scale centralised matching schemes.
Keywords: Stable marriage problem; Ties; Unacceptable partners; Inapproximability results;
Approximation algorithm
1 Introduction
An instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem (sm) [6, 21, 17] involves n men and n
women, each of whom ranks all the members of the opposite sex in strict order of preference.
A matching M in I is a bijection between the men and women. We say that a (man,woman)
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pair (m,w) blocks M , or is a blocking pair with respect to M , if each of m and w prefers the
other to his/her partner in M . A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be stable.
It is known that every instance of sm admits at least one stable matching [3], and that such
a matching can be found in O(n2) time using the Gale / Shapley algorithm [3].
The man-oriented version of the Gale/Shapley algorithm [3] yields a stable matching
called the man-optimal stable matching. This is the unique stable matching in which each
man has his best possible partner (and each woman her worst) among all stable matchings.
Similarly, the woman-oriented version leads to the woman-optimal stable matching with
analogous optimality conditions for the women (and pessimality conditions for the men).
“Fair” stable matchings
In view of the fact that man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings are woman-
pessimal and man-pessimal respectively, it is of interest to consider stable matchings that
are “fair” to both sexes in a precise sense. Given a matching M and a person q in a given
sm instance I, define the cost of M for q, denoted by cM (q), to be the ranking of pM(q)
in q’s preference list, where pM (q) denotes q’s partner in M . In other words, cM (q) is one
plus the number of persons whom q prefers to pM (q). Let U and W denote the set of men
and women in I respectively, and let M denote the set of stable matchings in I. Define an
egalitarian stable matching to be a stable matching S for which c(S) = minM∈M c(M), where
c(M) =
∑
q∈U∪W cM (q) for any M ∈M. Similarly, define a minimum regret stable matching
to be a stable matching S for which r(S) = minM∈M r(M), where r(M) = maxq∈U∪W cM (q)
for any M ∈ M. Finally, define a sex-equal stable matching to be a stable matching S for










for any M ∈M.
Intuitively, an egalitarian stable matching seeks to minimize the total cost of M taken over
all persons in I, whilst a minimum regret stable matching aims to minimize the maximum
cost of M taken over all persons in I. Finally in a sex-equal stable matching, the total cost
of M for the men in I is as close to the total cost of M for the women in I as possible.
Denote the problems of finding an egalitarian, minimum regret and sex-equal stable
matching by egalitarian sm, minimum regret sm and sex-equal sm respectively, given
an instance of sm. It is known that each of egalitarian sm and minimum regret sm is
polynomial-time solvable [13, 2, 7]. However sex-equal sm has been shown to be NP-hard
[16].
Ties in the preference lists
A natural generalisation of sm arises when each person need not rank all members of the
opposite sex in strict order. Some of those might be indifferent among certain members of
the opposite sex, so that preference lists may involve ties 1. We use smt to stand for the
variant of sm in which preference lists may include ties. (Henceforth we assume that a tie is
of length at least two.) In this context, a matching M is stable if there is no (man,woman)
pair (m,w), each of whom strictly prefers the other to his/her partner in M 2.
1In this paper, we restrict attention to the case where the indifference takes the form of ties in the
preference lists, but the results presented extend to the general case where the preference lists are arbitrary
partial orders.
2Implicitly here, and henceforth for other stability definitions, such a pair (m, w) is defined to block M ,
or to be a blocking pair with respect to M , as for the sm case.
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By breaking the ties arbitrarily, an instance I of smt becomes an instance I ′ of sm, and
clearly a stable matching in I ′ is also stable in I. Thus a stable matching in I can be found
using the Gale/Shapley algorithm. (Conversely, given a stable matching M in I, it is not
difficult to see that there is an instance IM of sm in which M is stable. Hence a matching M
is stable in I if and only if M is stable in some instance of sm obtained from I by breaking
the ties.)
The stability criterion considered here is referred to as weak stability in [11], where two
other notions of stability are formulated for smt, so-called strong stability and super-stability.
However an instance of smt need not admit a strongly stable matching or a super-stable
matching [11]. By contrast, we have already seen that every instance of smt admits at least
one weakly stable matching. Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, of these three definitions, it
is weak stability that has received the most attention in the literature [20, 19, 15, 18]. We
are concerned exclusively with weak stability in this paper, and henceforth for brevity, the
term stability will be used to indicate weak stability when ties are present.
The concept of the cost of a matching for a person may easily be extended to the smt
context. Given a matching M and a person q in an smt instance I, cM (q) is the (possibly
joint) ranking of pM (q) in q’s preference list. In other words, cM (q) is one plus the number
of persons whom q strictly prefers to pM (q). Given this extension of the definition of cM (q),
each of the definitions of an egalitarian, minimum regret and sex-equal stable matching in
an instance of smt follows immediately. Define egalitarian smt, minimum regret smt
and sex-equal smt to be the analogous problems to egalitarian sm, minimum regret
sm and sex-equal sm respectively, given an instance of smt.
It is known that each of egalitarian smt and minimum regret smt is NP-hard, and
not approximable within n1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where n is the number of persons
in a given smt instance [18]. In this paper we improve these results by demonstrating that
a worst possible Ω(n) lower bound on the approximability of each of these problems holds.
In addition we prove that a similar lower bound holds for sex-equal smt.
Unacceptable partners
An alternative natural extension of sm occurs when persons are permitted to express un-
acceptable partners. We say that person p is acceptable to person q if p appears on the
preference list of q, and unacceptable otherwise. If person q is missing from person p’s pref-
erence list, p is not prepared to be matched with q, or to form a blocking pair with q. We
use smi to stand for this variant of sm where preference lists may be incomplete.
It follows immediately that a matching M in an instance I of smi is now a one-one
correspondence between a subset of the men and a subset of the women, such that (m,w) ∈
M implies that each of m,w is acceptable to the other. Also, the revised notion of stability
may be defined as follows: M is stable if there is no (man,woman) pair (m,w), each of
whom is either unmatched in M and finds the other acceptable, or prefers the other to
his/her partner in M . (As a consequence of this definition, it follows that from the point
of view of finding stable matchings, we may assume, without loss of generality, that p is
acceptable to q if and only if q is acceptable to p.)
A stable matching in I need not be a complete matching. However, all stable matchings
in I have the same size, and involve exactly the same men and women [4]. Therefore, each
of the definitions of an egalitarian, a minimum regret and a sex-equal stable matching in an
instance of smi follows immediately from its sm definition if we discard the unmatched men
and women from consideration. In addition, it is a simple matter to extend the Gale/Shapley
algorithm to the smi setting (see [6, Section 1.4.2]).
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Ties and unacceptable partners
The variant of the stable marriage problem which incorporates both extensions described
above is denoted smti. Thus an instance I of smti comprises preference lists, each of which
may involve ties and/or unacceptable partners. A combination of the earlier definitions
indicates that a matching M in I is stable if there is no (man,woman) pair (m,w), each of
whom is either unmatched in M and finds the other acceptable, or strictly prefers the other
to his/her partner in M .
As observed above, all stable matchings for a given instance of smi are of the same size,
and all stable matchings for a given instance of smt are complete (and therefore of the same
size). However, for a given instance of smti, it is no longer the case that all stable matchings
need be of the same size [18]. Furthermore, each of the problems of finding a stable matching
of maximum or minimum size, given an smti instance, is NP-hard [15, 18]. Therefore one is
naturally led to consider the approximability properties of each of these problems. It turns
out that each problem admits an approximation algorithm with a performance ratio of 2,
since the size of any stable matching is at least half the size of a maximum cardinality stable
matching and is at most twice the size of a minimum cardinality stable matching [18]. This
has left open the question of whether better approximation algorithms for these problems
exist.
In this paper we present both positive and negative results regarding the approximability
of each of these problems: we show that the existence of a polynomial-time approximation
scheme (PTAS) for either of these problems is unlikely, since there exist constants δ, δ ′ such
that approximating each problem within a factor of δ, δ ′ (respectively) is NP-hard, under
strong restrictions on the instance. However, we also show that, for a given smti instance
I, the difference in size between a maximum and a minimum cardinality stable matching
is bounded by t(I), the number of preference lists that contain ties, and this leads to an
approximation algorithm for both problems with a performance guarantee dependent on t(I).
When t(I) is relatively small compared to the size of the instance, our result significantly
improves on the best-known previous result regarding the approximability of both problems,
namely the performance ratio of 2.
Practical applications
The problems of finding “fair” stable matchings and maximum cardinality stable matchings
in a given instance of smti have particular significance in practical applications. In a number
of countries, large-scale automated matching schemes produce stable matchings of graduating
medical students to hospital posts based on the preferences of students over hospitals and
vice versa. Examples of such schemes are the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)
[20] in the U.S., the Canadian Resident Matching Service (CaRMS) [1] and the Scottish Pre-
registration house officer Allocation scheme (SPA) [12].
The algorithms employed by the NRMP and CaRMS essentially solve a many-one gener-
alisation of smi called the Hospitals / Residents problem (hr) [6, Section 1.6]. In the context
of these two matching schemes, hospitals must rank a possibly large number of applicants
in strict order of preference. However, it is unrealistic to expect large and popular hospitals
to provide a strict ranking of all of their applicants. The SPA scheme permits hospitals to
include ties, a situation which may be modelled by a many-one matching problem known
as the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (hrt) [14], a generalisation of each of hr and
smti.
Thus, since the stable matchings in an instance of smti may be of different sizes, the
same is true for hrt. Yet a prime objective of any matching scheme must be to match as
many applicants as possible, and hence this motivates the search for large stable matchings.
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In addition, administrators of matching schemes may be interested to find stable matchings
that are as fair as possible for both applicants and hospitals alike, and hence this moti-
vates the search for egalitarian, minimum regret and sex-equal stable matchings. Thus our
approximability results have implications for matching schemes such as SPA.
Organisation of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we prove that it is hard to
approximate the min maximal matching optimization problem (defined in that section)
in a certain class of graphs. This result is required in order to establish, in Section 3,
the hardness results for the problems of approximating a maximum or minimum cardinality
stable matching in a given instance of smti. Then, in Section 4 we present the approximation
algorithm for the variants of these problems where, in a given smti instance, the number
of lists containing ties is bounded. The Ω(n) lower bounds for each of the problems of
approximating egalitarian smt, minimum regret smt and sex-equal smt are presented
in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we present some concluding remarks.
2 Hardness of approximating min maximal matching
We begin this section with some graph-related definitions. Given a graph G = (V,E), a
strongly stable set S is a subset of V such that the distance between every pair of vertices in
S is at least 3. A matching M in G is maximal if no proper superset of M is a matching in
G. Let β0(G), βSS(G) and β
−
1 (G) denote respectively the sizes of a maximum independent
set, a maximum strongly stable set and a minimum maximal matching in G. Define min
maximal matching to be the problem of computing β−1 (G), given a graph G.
min maximal matching is NP-hard, even for subdivision graphs of graphs of maximum
degree 3 [10] (given a graph G, the subdivision graph of G, denoted by S(G), is obtained by
subdividing each edge {u,w} of G in order to obtain two edges {u, v} and {v, w} of S(G),
where v is a new vertex). In this section, we will establish that min maximal matching is
hard to approximate in a certain graph class; this result will be required in the next section.
In particular, we will prove the following:
Theorem 2.1. It is NP-hard to approximate min maximal matching within δ0, for some
δ0 > 1. The result holds even if the instance is restricted to be the subdivision graph of some
cubic graph.
Our proof of Theorem 2.1 involves a chain of reductions starting from max-is. This is
the problem of computing β0(G), given a graph G. We denote by max-is(k) the restriction
of max-is in which G is regular of degree k.
Theorem 2.2 ([9]). It is NP-hard to approximate max-is(3) within δ1, for some δ1 < 1.
In fact, there exists a constant c1 > 0 such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between
instances G = (V,E) of max-is(3) such that β0(G) ≥ c1n and β0(G) < δ1c1n, where n = |V |.
We will use Theorem 2.2 together with the notion of a gap-preserving reduction [22,
p.308], which may be defined as follows:
Definition 2.3. Let Π1 and Π2 be two optimization problems. Denote by OPTi(x) the
optimal measure over all feasible solutions for a given instance x of Πi (i ∈ {1, 2}). Let α
be some constant (α ≤ 1 if Π1 is a maximization problem; α ≥ 1 otherwise), and let g1 be a
function that maps an instance x of Π1 to a positive rational number. Then a gap-preserving
reduction from Π1 to Π2 is a tuple 〈f, β, g2〉 such that:
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• f maps an instance x of Π1 to an instance f(x) of Π2 in polynomial time;
• β is a constant (β ≤ 1 if Π2 is a maximization problem; β ≥ 1 otherwise);
• g2 maps an instance f(x) of Π2 to a positive rational number;
• if Π1 and Π2 are maximization problems, then for any instance x of Π1:
– if OPT1(x) ≥ g1(x), then OPT2(f(x)) ≥ g2(f(x));
– if OPT1(x) < αg1(x), then OPT2(f(x)) < βg2(f(x));
(if Πi is a minimization problem, for i ∈ {1, 2}, then the two inequalities involving
OPTi in the above conditions should be reversed).
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Definition 2.3.
Proposition 2.4. Let Π1 and Π2 be two maximization problems, and suppose that there is
a gap-preserving reduction from Π1 to Π2. Assuming the notation of Definition 2.3, suppose
further that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances x of Π1 such that OPT1(x) ≥ g1(x)
and OPT1(x) < αg1(x). Then it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances f(x) of Π2
such that OPT2(f(x)) ≥ g2(f(x)) and OPT2(f(x)) < βg2(f(x)). (If Πi is a minimization
problem, for i ∈ {1, 2}, then the two inequalities involving OPTi in the above conditions
should be reversed). Hence it is NP-hard to approximate Π2 within β.
Our first gap-preserving reduction involves max-sss. This is the problem of computing
βSS(G) for a given graph G. We denote by max-sss(k) the restriction of max-sss in which
G is regular of degree k.
Theorem 2.5. It is NP-hard to approximate max-sss(3) within δ2, for some δ2 < 1.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be a cubic graph, given as an instance of max-is(3), where n = |V |
and m = |E|. We construct a cubic graph G′ = (V ′, E′) as an instance of max-sss(3) as
follows. As in the proof of Corollary 3.4 of [10], we initially replace every edge {v, w} of G
by a component comprising the edges {v, u}, {u,w}, {u, u′}, {u′, u′′}. This leaves m vertices
of degree 1 in G′ and m vertices of degree 2 in G′.
We may eliminate such vertices as follows. To every vertex v of degree 1 in G′, connect
the component shown in Figure 1(a). Similarly, for every vertex v of degree 2 in G ′, connect
the component shown in Figure 1(b). It is then clear that the modified graph G ′ is cubic.
It is straightforward to verify that G has an independent set of size k if and only if G ′
has a strongly stable set of size 3m + k, and hence βSS(G
′) = β0(G) + 3m. Now 2m = 3n as
G is cubic, and it may be verified that n′ = 22n, where n′ = |V ′|.
Now let c1 and δ1 be the constants given by Theorem 2.2, such that it is NP-hard to
distinguish between the cases β0(G) ≥ c1n and β0(G) < δ1c1n. Hence if β0(G) ≥ c1n, then
βSS(G
′) ≥ c2n
′, whilst if β0(G) < δ1c1n, then βSS(G
′) < δ2c2n






. The result then follows by Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 2.4.
Our second gap-preserving reduction is sufficient to prove Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be a cubic graph, given as an instance of max-sss(3),
where n = |V | and m = |E|. The constructed instance of min maximal matching is S(G)
(recall that S(G) is the subdivision graph of G). Now by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 of [10], G has
a strongly stable set of size k if and only if S(G) has a maximal matching of size n−k. Thus
it follows that β−1 (S(G)) + βSS(G) = n. Now 2m = 3n as G is cubic, and m
′ = 2m, where
m′ is the number of edges of S(G).
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Figure 1: Components attached to vertices of degree 1 or 2 in G′.
Now let c2 and δ2 be the constants given by Theorem 2.5, such that it is NP-hard to
distinguish between the cases βSS(G) ≥ c2n and βSS(G) < δ2c2n. Hence if βSS(G) ≥ c2n,
then β−1 (S(G)) ≤ c0m
′, whilst if βSS(G) < δ2c2n, then β
−
1 (S(G)) > δ0c0m






. The result then follows by Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 2.4.
3 Hardness of approximating max smti and min smti
Given an instance I of smti, let s+(I) (respectively s−(I)) denote the size of a maximum
(respectively minimum) cardinality stable matching in I. Define max (respectively min)
smti to be the problem of computing s+(I) (respectively s−(I)), given an smti instance I.
Each of max smti and min smti is NP-hard [15, 18]. In this section we prove that there
exist constants δ, δ′ such that each of the problems of approximating max smti and min
smti within a factor of δ, δ′ (respectively) is NP-hard. In each case, the result holds under
the restriction that the ties belong to the preference lists of one sex only, and preference lists
have constant length. We begin by considering max smti.
Theorem 3.1. It is NP-hard to approximate max smti within δ3, for some δ3 < 1. The
result holds even if the preference lists in the given instance are of constant length, there is
at most one tie per list, and the ties occur on one side only.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be the subdivision graph of some cubic graph, given as an instance
of min maximal matching. Then G has a bipartition of V into the left-hand vertex set U
and the right-hand vertex set W , where every vertex in U has degree 3 and every vertex in
W has degree 2.
Let U = {m1,m2, . . . ,ms} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wt}. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ s), assume that
mi is adjacent in G to the vertices in Wi, where Wi = {wk3i−2 , wk3i−1 , wk3i}. Also, assume
that pj and qj are two sequences such that pj < qj, {mpj , wj} ∈ E and {mqj , wj} ∈ E
(1 ≤ j ≤ t).
We form an instance I of max smti as follows. Let U be the set of men in I, where
U = U ∪ X ∪ Z, X = {x1, x2, . . . , xt}, and Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zt}. Also, let W be the set of
women in I, where W = W ∪W ′ ∪ Y , W ′ = {w′1, w
′
2, . . . , w
′
t}, and Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ys}. For
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ s), let W ′i = {w
′
k3i−2
, w′k3i−1 , w
′
k3i
}. Clearly |U| = |W| = s + 2t. Create a
preference list for each person in I as follows:
mi : (Wi ∪W
′
i ) yi (1 ≤ i ≤ s) wj : zj mpj mqj xj (1 ≤ j ≤ t)
xi : wi (1 ≤ i ≤ t) w
′
j : zj mqj mpj (1 ≤ j ≤ t)
zi : (wi w
′
i) (1 ≤ i ≤ t) yj : mj (1 ≤ j ≤ s)
Note that, in a given preference list throughout this paper, persons listed within round
brackets are tied. Clearly the ties in I occur in the men’s preference lists only and there is
at most one tie per list. Also each man’s list has length at most 7, whilst each woman’s list
has length at most 4.
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Suppose that M is a maximal matching in G, where |M | = β−1 (G). We construct a
matching M ′ in I as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ s), suppose firstly that mi is matched in
M , to wj say (1 ≤ j ≤ t). If i = pj, add the pairs (mi, wj) and (zj , w
′
j) to M
′. If i = qj, add
the pairs (mi, w
′
j) and (zj , wj) to M
′.
On the other hand, if mi is unmatched, add the pair (mi, yi) to M
′.




Clearly M ′ is a matching in I, and |M ′| = 2|M |+ (s− |M |) + 2(t− |M |) = s + 2t− |M |.
It is straightforward to verify that no man in X ∪ Z can belong to a blocking pair of M ′.
Now suppose that (mi, w) blocks M
′ for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ s) and w ∈ W. Then (mi, yi) ∈ M
′,
so that w = wj for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ t) and (xj , wj) ∈ M
′. Thus each of mi and wj is
unmatched in M , and {mi, wj} ∈ E. Thus M ∪{{mi, wj}} is a matching in G, contradicting
the maximality of M . Hence M ′ is stable in I. Also s+(I) ≥ s + 2t− |M | = s + 2t− β−1 (G).
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I, where |M ′| = s+(I). For each j
(1 ≤ j ≤ t), either (zj , wj) ∈ M
′ or (zj , w
′
j) ∈ M





(1 ≤ i ≤ s) ∧ (1 ≤ j ≤ t) ∧
((mi, wj) ∈ M





is a matching in G. Also |M ′| ≤ |M | + (t − |M |) + t + (s − |M |) = s + 2t − |M |, for every
edge in M contributes one (man,woman) pair to M ′, and in addition, at most (t−|M |) men
in X can be matched in M ′, exactly t men in Z are matched in M ′, and at most (s− |M |)
women in Y can be matched in M ′ (and everybody who could be matched in M ′ has now
been counted).
Suppose that M is not maximal. Then there is some edge {mi, wj} in G such that no edge
of M is incident to either mi or wj . Thus by definition of M , either mi is unmatched in M
′ or
(mi, yi) ∈ M
′. Similarly, either (i) (xj , wj) ∈ M
′ or wj is unmatched, or (ii) w
′
j is unmatched
in M ′. In case (i) (mi, wj) blocks M




Hence M is a maximal matching in G, and s+(I) = |M ′| ≤ s + 2t− |M | ≤ s + 2t− β−1 (G).
Hence s+(I)+β−1 (G) = s+2t. Now 2t = 3s, as G is the subdivision graph of some cubic
graph. Also n = s+2t and m = 2t, where n is the number of men in I and m is the number
of edges of G.
Let c0 and δ0 be the constants given by Theorem 2.1, such that it is NP-hard to distinguish
between the cases β−1 (G) ≤ c0m and β
−
1 (G) > δ0c0m. Hence if β
−
1 (G) ≤ c0m, then s
+(I) ≥
c3n, whilst if β
−
1 (G) > δ0c0m, then s
+(I) < δ3c3n, where c3 =
4−3c0




result then follows by Theorem 2.1 and Proposition 2.4.
We now demonstrate how to modify the proof of Theorem 3.1 in order to establish the
hardness of approximating min smti under the same restrictions.
Theorem 3.2. It is NP-hard to approximate min smti within δ4, for some δ4 > 1. The
result holds even if the preference lists in I are of constant length, there is at most one tie
per list, and the ties occur on one side only.
Proof. The gap-preserving reduction is similar to the one given by the proof of Theorem 3.1,
with some small modifications. In the constructed instance I, the set of men and women no
longer includes the persons in X ∪ Y . Any such person is now removed from the preference
list of any remaining person in I. Now each man’s preference list is of length at most 6 and
each woman’s preference list is of length at most 3.
Suppose firstly that M is a maximal matching in G, where |M | = β−1 (G). The construc-
tion of the matching M ′ in I is similar to the previous one; the only difference is as follows.
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If mi is unmatched in M , no pair is added to M
′, whilst if wj is unmatched in M , the pair
(zj , wj) is added to M
′. It is straightforward to verify that M ′ is a stable matching in I and
s−(I) ≤ |M ′| = t + |M | = t + β−1 (G).
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I, where |M ′| = s−(I). Then
using a similar argument to before we may construct a maximal matching M in G, where
s−(I) = |M ′| = t + |M | ≥ t + β−1 (G).
Hence s−(I) = t + β−1 (G). Now 2t = 3s, as G is the subdivision graph of some cubic
graph. Also n = s + t and m = 2t, where n is the number of men in I and m is the number
of edges of G.
Let c0 and δ0 be the constants given by Theorem 2.1, such that it is NP-hard to distinguish
between the cases β−1 (G) ≤ c0m and β
−
1 (G) > δ0c0m. Hence if β
−
1 (G) ≤ c0m, then s
−(I) ≤
c4n, whilst if β
−
1 (G) > δ0c0m, then s
−(I) < δ4c4n, where c4 =
3(1+2c0)




The result then follows by Theorem 2.1 and Proposition 2.4.
It follows immediately from Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 that neither max smti nor min smti
admits a polynomial-time approximation scheme unless P=NP.
4 Approximation algorithm for max smti and min smti
As observed earlier, it is shown in [18] that a maximum cardinality stable matching can
have size at most twice that of a minimum cardinality stable matching. Hence the obvious
polynomial-time algorithm for smti – break all ties in an arbitrary way and apply the classical
Gale/Shapley algorithm to the resulting instance of smi – is simultaneously an approximation
algorithm for both max and min smti with a performance ratio of 2.
There is no known approximation algorithm for either problem with a stronger perfor-
mance ratio, even for special cases of the problems in which the ties are restricted to one
side, or to the tails of the preference lists. A case of particular interest arises when there is
a limit on the number of preference lists that contain ties, and in this section we show that
some progress can be made in establishing additional approximation bounds in this setting.
Ideally, in the case of max smti, one might hope for a bound of the form s+(I)/|M | ≤
f(p) given an instance I of smti, where M is a stable matching found by some approximation
algorithm (or just any stable matching, found by breaking ties arbitrarily), p is the proportion
of preference lists that contain ties, and f(p) is a function that decreases to 1 as p decreases
to 0.
However, it is not hard to see that a bound of this form is infeasible. Were such an
algorithm to exist, a ‘gap’ argument could be used to show that it could solve instances of
max smti exactly. Given an arbitrary such instance, it could be ‘expanded’ by the addition
of new persons, none of whom has a tie in his or her list, and none of whom can be matched
in any stable matching. With an appropriate expansion factor, application of the supposed
approximation algorithm to this derived instance would solve the original instance exactly.
Instead we derive a bound on the difference in size between a maximum (or minimum)
cardinality stable matching and an arbitrary stable matching, expressed in terms of the num-
ber of preference lists that contain ties. So the usual approximation algorithm – break all
ties arbitrarily and apply the Gale/Shapley algorithm – has a performance guarantee, for
both max smti and min smti, expressible as a difference rather than a ratio. As observed
by Garey and Johnson [5, pp.137-138], this form of performance guarantee can reasonably
be viewed as being stronger than the more familiar performance ratio form, and there are
relatively few NP-hard problems for which approximation algorithms with performance guar-
antees of this kind are known.
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Some additional definitions are necessary before presenting the main results of this sec-
tion. Let M and M ′ be stable matchings for an instance I of smti. If a person p strictly
prefers his partner in M to his partner in M ′, or is matched in M but not in M ′, then we say
that p strictly prefers M to M ′. If p is indifferent between his partners in M and M ′, or has
the same partner in M as in M ′, or is matched in neither M nor M ′, then we say that p is
indifferent between M and M ′. Define a tied pair to be a pair (m,w) such that m is in a tie
in w’s list, or w is in a tie in m’s list (or both). In what follows, tp(M) denotes the number
of tied pairs in M , and t(I) denotes the number of preference lists in I that contain ties. In
general tp(M) depends on the matching M , whilst t(I) is invariant for the given instance I;
clearly tp(M) ≤ t(I). 3
Lemma 4.1. Let T be a maximum cardinality stable matching for a given instance I of
smti. Then if M is an arbitrary stable matching in I, |T | ≤ |M |+ tp(M).
Proof. We construct an undirected graph G = G(M,T ) as follows: G has a vertex for each
person in I, and two vertices are joined by a blue (respectively red) edge if the corresponding
persons are matched in T but not in M (respectively in M but not in T ). It is clear
that the connected components of G are paths and cycles with edges of alternating colour.
Furthermore, |T | − |M | is at most equal to the number of blue augmenting paths in G, i.e.,
the number of paths of odd length in which the first and last edges are blue. Further, every
such path has at least three edges, since a component that is a path of length one would
provide a blocking pair for one of the supposed stable matchings.
We claim that, in every blue augmenting path, at least one of the intermediate vertices
represents a person who is indifferent between T and M , and is therefore in a tied pair in
both T and M . This claim, together with the preceding observation, suffices to establish the
lemma.
To establish the claim, let p1, q1, . . . , pr, qr form a blue augmenting path in G, for some
r ≥ 2. Since p1 and qr are both matched in T but not in M , they both strictly prefer T to
M . Suppose that no person in the path is indifferent between T and M . A simple inductive
proof starting from p1 then reveals that qi (i = 1, 2, . . . , r − 1) strictly prefers M to T ,
otherwise (pi, qi) would block M , and pi (i = 2, 3, . . . , r) strictly prefers T to M , otherwise
(pi, qi−1) would block T . Thus (pr, qr) blocks M , a contradiction. Hence at least one of the
pi (2 ≤ i ≤ r) or qi (1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1) must be indifferent between T and M , as claimed.
Since tp(M) ≤ |M |, it follows immediately by Lemma 4.1 that there exists an approxi-
mation algorithm for max smti with performance ratio 2. Using a similar argument to the
one employed in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we may deduce that |M | ≤ |S| + tp(S), where S
is a stable matching of minimum cardinality. Since tp(S) ≤ |S|, it follows immediately that
there exists an approximation algorithm for min smti, also with performance ratio 2. The
inequality established by Lemma 4.1 also leads to the following result:
Theorem 4.2. There is an approximation algorithm A such that, given any instance I of
either max smti or min smti, A finds a stable matching M in I satisfying the following
inequality:
s+(I)− t(I) ≤ |M | ≤ s−(I) + t(I).
Additionally, we have that s+(I) ≤ s−(I) + t(I).
3The results of this section may be extended to the case that preference lists are partially ordered by
making the following amendments to two key definitions. In this setting, define a tied pair to be a pair (m, w)
such that w is indifferent between m and some other man, or m is indifferent between w and some other
woman (or both). Define t(I) to be the number of preference lists that are not linearly ordered.
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Proof. Let M be defined as in Lemma 4.1. Since tp(M) ≤ t(I), Lemma 4.1 implies that
s+(I)− t(I) ≤ |M | ≤ s+(I). Also by Lemma 4.1, s+(I) ≤ s−(I) + t(I), and hence the result
follows.
We remark that, when the ties in a given instance I of smti are sparse, i.e. t(I) is small
compared to the numbers of men and women in I, the performance guarantee indicated by
Theorem 4.2 is a significant improvement on the best-known previous result, namely the
2-approximation algorithm for each of max smti and min smti.
The following instance is an illustration of the worst case for the above theorem. For
each n ≥ 1, we define an smti instance I with 2n men, namely {p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn}, and
2n women, namely {r1, . . . , rn, s1, . . . , sn}. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), define preference lists for
pi, qi, ri, si as follows:
pi : si ri ri : pi
qi : si si : (pi qi)
There is a stable matching of size n (namely M1 = {(pi, si) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) and one of size 2n
(namely M2 = {(pi, ri), (qi, si) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}). Clearly s
+(I) = 2n, and also s−(I) = n since
|M2| = 2|M1|. Since the difference between s
+(I) and s−(I) is the number of lists with ties,
the bounds given by Theorem 4.2 are tight.
5 “Fair” stable matchings in smt
In this section we give Ω(n) lower bounds for the approximabililty of egalitarian smt,
minimum regret smt and sex-equal smt in an instance of smt with n men and n
women. We begin by considering egalitarian smt. Note that, for any matching M in such
an instance of smt, it follows that 2n ≤ c(M) ≤ 2n2. Hence an approximation algorithm
with performance guarantee n is trivial. Our inapproximability result is therefore optimal
within a constant factor.
Theorem 5.1. It is NP-hard to approximate egalitarian smt within δn, for some δ > 0,
where n is the number of men in a given smt instance.
Proof. We give a reduction from an instance I of max smti as constructed by the proof of
Theorem 3.1. One property of I is that there exists a constant d such that the length of
each preference list in I is at most d. Let c3 and δ3 be the constants given by Theorem 3.1,
such that it is NP-hard to distinguish the cases s+(I) ≥ c3n and s
+(I) < δ3c3n, where n is
the number of men in I.
Let X = {m1,m2, · · · ,mn} be the set of men in I and let Y = {w1, w2, · · · , wn} be the
set of women of I. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let Pi and Qi denote the preference lists of mi and
wi in I respectively. We call the women in Pi proper women for mi, and we call the men in
Qi proper men for wi.
We transform I into an instance I ′ of egalitarian smt as follows. Let U = X ∪
X ′ and W = Y ∪ Y ′ be the sets of men and women in I ′ respectively, where X ′ =
{m′1,m
′
2, · · · ,m
′
(1−c3)n
} and Y ′ = {w′1, w
′
2, · · · , w
′
(1−c3)n
}. The preference lists in I ′ are con-
structed as follows:
mi : Pi (Y
′) [Y \Pi] (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
m′i : (W ) (1 ≤ i ≤ (1− c3)n)
wi : Qi (X
′) [X\Qi] (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
w′i : (U) (1 ≤ i ≤ (1− c3)n)
Note that, in a given person’s preference list, persons within square brackets are listed
in arbitrary strict order where the symbol appears.
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Suppose firstly that I has a stable matching M such that |M | ≥ c3n. Then there is a set
Xu ⊆ X of men who are unmatched in M , where |Xu| ≤ (1 − c3)n. Similarly there is a set
Yu ⊆ Y of women who are unmatched in M , where |Yu| ≤ (1− c3)n. Let M1 be a matching
that assigns each man in Xu to a woman in Y
′, and let M2 be a matching that assigns each
woman in Yu to a man in X
′. Now let M3 be a perfect matching of the remaining unmatched
members of X ′ and Y ′. Finally let M ′ = M ∪M1 ∪M2 ∪M3. It may be verified that M
′ is
a stable matching in I ′, and
c(M ′) ≤ 2n(d + 1) + 2(1− c3)n
≤ 2n(d + 2).
On the other hand, suppose s+(I) < δ3c3n. Now let M
′ be any stable matching in I ′.
Then < δ3c3n men in X are matched in M
′ to one of their proper women. Now at most
(1 − c3)n of the remaining men in X can be matched to a woman in Y
′. Hence there are
> c3n(1 − δ3) men u in X such that cM ′(u) > (1 − c3)n. Similarly there are > c3n(1 − δ3)
women w in Y such that cM ′(w) > (1−c3)n. Hence c(M
′) > 2εn2, where ε = c3(1−c3)(1−δ3).
Therefore by Theorem 3.1, it is NP-hard to approximate egalitarian smt within ε
d+2n.
We now consider minimum regret smt. Note that, for any matching M in an instance
of smt with n men and n women, it follows that 1 ≤ r(M) ≤ n. Hence an approximation
algorithm with performance guarantee n is trivial. Therefore again, the Ω(n) lower bound
that we establish is optimal within a constant factor.
Theorem 5.2. It is NP-hard to approximate minimum regret smt within δn, for some
δ > 0, where n is the number of men in a given smt instance.
Proof. We use the same reduction as described in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Let I, I ′, n,
c3, δ3 and d be as above. If s
+(I) ≥ c3n, then I
′ has a stable matching M ′ such that
r(M ′) ≤ d + 1. On the other hand, if s+(I) < δ3c3n then in any stable matching M
′ in I ′,
at least one man u ∈ X satisfies cM ′(u) > (1− c3)n. Hence r(M
′) > (1− c3)n. Therefore by
Theorem 3.1, it is NP-hard to approximate minimum regret smt within 1−c3
d+1 n.
The final problem that we consider in this section is sex-equal smt. We establish an
inapproximability result for this problem similar to those of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2.
Theorem 5.3. It is NP-hard to approximate sex-equal smt within δn, for some δ > 0,
where n is the number of men in a given smt instance.
Proof. We formulate a reduction similar to the one described in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Let I, X, X ′, Y , Y ′, Pi, Qi, n, c3, δ3 and d be as above. We transform I into an instance
I ′ of sex-equal smt as follows. Let U = X ∪ X ′ ∪ S and W = Y ∪ Y ′ ∪ T be the sets of
men and women in I ′ respectively, where S = {s1, s2, · · · , sd} and T = {t1, t2, · · · , td}. The
preference lists in I ′ are constructed as follows:
mi : Pi (W\Pi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
m′i : (W ) (1 ≤ i ≤ (1− c3)n)
si : ti [W\{ti}] (1 ≤ i ≤ d)
wi : [S] Qi (X
′) [X\Qi] (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
w′i : (U) (1 ≤ i ≤ (1− c3)n)
ti : si [U\{si}] (1 ≤ i ≤ d)
Clearly in any stable matching M ′ in I ′, (si, ti) ∈ M
′.
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Suppose firstly that I has a stable matching M such that |M | ≥ c3n. Then we may
form M ′ as in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Add (si, ti) to M
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ d). It may be verified
that M ′ is stable in I ′. Also the total cost of M ′ for the men is at most (d + 1)n + (1 −
c3)n + d. Similarly the total cost of M
′ for the women is at most (2d + 1)n + (1 − c3)n +





∣∣ = ∣∣∑u∈X cM ′(u)−∑w∈Y cM ′(w)∣∣ ≤∑
u∈X cM ′(u) +
∑
w∈Y cM ′(w) = (3d + 2)n.
On the other hand, suppose that s+(I) < δ3c3n. Now let M
′ be any stable matching in I ′.
As in the previous paragraph, the total cost of M ′ for the men is at most (d+1)n+(1−c3)n+d.
No woman w ∈ Y is matched in M ′ to a man in S, so cM ′(w) ≥ d + 1. As in the proof of
Theorem 5.1, there are > c3n(1− δ3) women w in Y such that cM ′(w) ≥ (d + 1) + (1− c3)n.
Hence the total cost of M ′ for the women is more than
(d + 1)n + c3n(1− δ3)(1− c3)n + (1− c3)n + d.
Thus d(M ′) > εn2, where ε is as defined in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Therefore by Theorem 3.1, it is NP-hard to approximate sex-equal smt within ε3d+2n.
6 Concluding remarks
It is interesting to note that the hardness results proved in this paper for approximating both
max smti and min smti hold for identical restrictions on the positions of ties – there are
relatively few examples in the literature of optimization problems having both maximization
and minimization versions that are hard to approximate, and fewer still where this property
holds for the same restrictions on the instance.
It remains open as to whether there exists an approximation algorithm for either max
smti or min smti having performance ratio less than 2. However the progress made in
this paper indicates that improvements can be obtained when ties are restricted in number.
One might hope for further progress when there are additional constraints in place – on the
positions and lengths of ties, for example.
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